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Abstract: This study examines the impact of ownership concentration on debt 
structure. Based on market capitalisation, we obtained financial and governance data 
from Top 100 public listed companies in Malaysia for the period 2011-2015. Ordinary 
least squares and fixed-effect panel models were employed for examining data. The 
regression results showed that ownership held by the top five shareholders significantly 
and negatively affected long term debt and total debt ratios. The results remain 
qualitatively similar in both estimations using the ordinary least squares and fixed-
effect panel models. In summary, this study offers some insights into how concentrated 
ownership influence corporate debt structure. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Concentrated ownership is common throughout the world and it refers to 
the amount of stock owned by individual investors and large-block 
shareholders (investors that hold at least 5 per cent of equity ownership 
within the firm). In publicly traded firms, large block holders are normally 
institutional investors in the form of pension funds and mutual funds.   
(Claessens, Djankov, & Lang, 2000; Lo, Ting, Kweh, & Yang, 2016). La 
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (1999) examined organisations in 27 
countries characterised by high ownership concentration. Claessens, 
Djankov, and Lang (2000) meanwhile found t that 66% of organisations in 
nine East Asian countries they examined are under substantial 
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shareholders’ control. Earlier studies have indicated that ownership 
structure affects debt structure (for example, de La Bruslerie & Latrous, 
2012). 
Ownership concentration enables the controller to have massive 
influence in policy-making, particularly in the capital structure decision 
(Liu & Sun, 2010; Bany-Ariffin, Mat, & McGowan, 2010). Previous 
researches have emphasised the association between ownership 
concentration and corporate financing, with particular focus on capital 
structure decison (Bunkanwanicha, Gupta, & Rokhim, 2008; Liu, Tian, & 
Wang, 2011). Only a few studies examined the association between 
ownership concentration and debt structure (Shyu & Lee, 2009).  
In Malaysia, a few studies had examined the existence of ownership 
concentration (Ishak & Napier, 2004; Malan, Salamudin, & Ahmad, 2012). 
However, there has been very little research on the relationship between 
ownership concentration and debt structure in Malaysia. Thus, this paper 
attempts to fill that gap and to assess the impact of ownership concentration 
on debt structure of public listed companies (PLC) in Malaysia. 
The paper contributes to literature by first, attempting to test ownership 
concentration using two proxies. The fraction of shares held by the largest 
shareholders are used as a measure of concentration in ownership structure 
and five largest shareholders are used as proxy. Second, the study focuses 
on a unique sample that is 100 Top 100 PLCs in Malaysia based on market 
capitalisation. These companies make up a big portion of the Malaysian 
market.  
The present study provides policymakers with the trend of ownership 
concentration and debt structure in Malaysia. Additionally, it allows 
investors to gain a better understanding of how ownership concentration 
affect debt structure for effective investment in PLC in Malaysia. Finally, 
the study enhances creditability of previous researches. 
The rest of this study is organised in the following manner: The 
following section discusses relevant literature and proposes a hypothesis. 
The third section reports sources of data and description of variables. The 
fourth section discusses findings while the final section summarises and 
concludes the paper. 
 
2. Review of Prior Studies 
 
2.1 Ownership Concentration and Debt Structure 
 
Shareholders with concentrated ownership are found to help minimise 
agency problems (Drieffield, Mahambre, & Pal, 2007) through capital 
structure decision. Thus, understanding how ownership concentration 
affects debt structure is important. Brailsford, Oliver, and Pua (2002) 
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emphasised that shareholders can monitor and control their companies by 
deciding on their debt structure. Generally, shareholders favour debt 
financing in the companies to discipline and monitor managers’ activities, 
and thus, ownership concentration is associated with high debt levels. 
Shleifer and Vishny (1986) stated increase in ownership share is one of the 
reason shareholders have interests in the company which gives them more 
influence over the organisation. Large external shareholders reduce 
instances of shareholder-manager conflicts (Friend & Lang, 1988; Short, 
Keassey, & Dexbury, 2002). Drieffield, Mahambre and Pal (2007) found 
ownership concentration positively affects the leverage of family 
companies in Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia. This finding was 
corroborated by Deesomsak, Paudyal, and Pescetto (2004) and Pindado and 
La Torre (2011) namely, the existence of a positive relationship between 
ownership concentration and leverage. This shows the closer the 
relationship between owners and debtholders, the easier for the former to 
access borrowing and thus, reduce agency costs. On the other hand, many 
scholars agree shareholders prefer debt rather than equity financing to 
retain their control in the firm and avoid ownership dilution (Zhang, 2013; 
Drieffield, Mahambre, & Pal, 2007; Lundstrum, 2009). They explain that 
controlling shareholders are usually active in monitoring and asserting 
control over managerial discretion via debt financing. 
However, other studies point to a negative link between ownership 
concentration and leverage on debt level. Short, Keassey and Dexbury 
(2002) for example found large external shareholdings are negatively 
related to debt level. This is a result of active engagement of external 
shareholders in controlling management in debt restructuring. Liu, Tian and 
Wang (2011) also reported about expropriation issues between both large 
and minority shareholders. The controlling shareholders will usually work 
to secure their own best interest to the detriment of minority shareholders 
(La Porta, Lopes-de-Silanes & Shleifer, 1999; Liu, Tian, & Wang, 2011; 
Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). Friend & Lang (1988) and Johnson et al. (2000) 
explained that large shareholders may expropriate minority shareholders in 
two ways - by transferring resources out of their firms and by supporting 
non-profit projects for their private benefits. Santos, Moreira, and Vieira 
(2013) also reported a negative impact of ownership concentration on debt 
level. In firms with ownership concentration, agency costs are found to be 
low and thus, managers have limited debt issue because their decisions are 
influenced by the large shareholders (Shleifer & Vishny, 1986; Zhang, 
2013). Wiwattanakantang (1999) showed that ownership concentration 
would mean control, which in turn minimises managerial opportunistic 
behaviours in public listed firms in Thailand. Furthermore, Grier and 
Zychowicz (1994) stated large shareholders with concentrated ownership 
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used substitute debt in order to control the activities of management, and 
thus reported a negative effect of ownership concentration on debt level.  
In conclusion, the association between concentration ownership and 
debt structure is still vague. Therefore, the following hypothesis is 
developed: 
 
Hypothesis 1: A significant association exists between ownership 
concentration and the debt structure of public listed companies in 
Malaysia. 
 
2.2 Control Variables and Debt Structure 
 
2.2.1 Growth and Debt Structure 
 
Myers (1984) refers to the pecking order hypothesis - in describing 
financing practice -   which drives means of financing. This is due to the 
asymmetrical information problem related to investors and firm managers. 
Hall et al. (2004) emphasised that growth is likely to place greater demand 
on internally generated funds and push firms into borrowing. In other 
words, higher level of firm growth will lead to increased debt. The 
following studies indicated a positive relationship between growth 
opportunities and debt structure in Nigeria (Salawu & Ile-Ife, 2007); 
Pakistan (Shah & Khan, 2007); and Jordan (Al-Najjar & Taylor, 2008). 
However, Titman and Wessels (1988) and Qian et al. (2009) found a 
negative association between growth opportunities and debt structure in US 
and China, respectively. The empirical evidence regarding the relationship 
between growth opportunities and debt structure is mixed. Hence, the 
following hypothesis is proposed: 
 
Hypothesis 2: There is a significant association between growth 
opportunities and debt structure of public listed companies in Malaysia. 
 
2.2.2 Size and Debt Structure 
 
According to Trade-off Theory and Pecking Order Theory, a company’s 
size determines a firm’s debt decision. Karadeniz et al. (2009) found that 
larger firms are better diversified and have a low likelihood of experiencing 
financial distress. The finding is consistent with that of Deesomsak et al. 
(2004) and Abor and Biekpe (2009). The result supports the Trade-off 
theory. In contrast, the Pecking Order theory suggests that firm size 
correlates negatively with debt due to less asymmetrical information. Rajan 
and Zingales (1995) and Frank and Goyal (2009) confirmed that larger 
firms tend to reduce the chances of undervaluation of new equity issue, 
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thus, it encourages them to resort to reduce debt financing. Hence, the 
following hypothesis is developed: 
Hypothesis 3: A significant association exists between firm size and  debt 
structure of public listed companies in Malaysia. 
 
2.2.3 ROA and Debt Structure 
 
Based on the Trade-off theory, there is tax incentive for debt and this 
implication suggests that firms should use as much as possible debt to 
finance their needs. In other words, firms with higher profitability will 
issue debt in order to reduce their tax burden (Hijazi & Tariq, 2006). Morri 
and Cristanziani (2009) confirmed that firms will choose internal capital 
sources due to information asymmetries. Therefore, market value of the 
company is expected to increase due to an improved profitability, based on 
the Pecking Order theory. Thus, the Trade-off theory supports a positive 
relationship between profitability and leverage, whereas the Pecking Order 
Theory indicates the reverse (Myers, 1977). Nevertheless, empirical studies 
have generally shown a negative relationship between leverage and 
profitability (Hijazi & Tariq, 2006; Morri & Cristanziani, 2009). the current 
study predicts a negative relationship between leverage and profitability. 
The ROA (Returns on Asset) assesses a firm’s profitability, hence, the 
current study uses the value of the ratio of earnings before interest and 
taxes to total assets. More profitable firms not only have lower cost of 
bankruptcy and financial distress, but also have efficient management (Cao 
et al., 2004; Glover &Hambusch, 2014). Hence, the following hypothesis is 
developed: 
 
Hypothesis 4: A significant association exists between profitability and the 
debt structure of public listed companies in Malaysia. 
 
3. Data and Variables 
 
3.1 Source of Data 
 
The sample of this study was 100 public-listed firms (based on their market 
value) in Malaysia as at 31 December 2015. After removing financial firms 
from the sample, 88 public listed companies were selected over the sample 
period. The data of ownership concentration was extracted from 
companies’ financial reports, and others from the Datastream and Thomson 
Eikon databases. 
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3.2 Variables and Model 
 
The dependent variables used in this paper are Long Term Debt (LTD) and 
Total Debt (TD) whereby the former is calculated as the ratio of the book 
value of long term debt to total assets (Hall, Hutchnison, & Michaelas, 
2004). Meanwhile, TD, which represents the debt level of a company 
(Diamond &Verrecchia, 1991; Sharpe 1991), was calculated as the ratio of 
the book value of total debt to total assets (Su and Li, 2013). 
The independent variable for this paper was ownership concentration 
consisting of the largest shareholder (OC1) and five largest shareholders 
(OC5). The OC1 was computed as the percentage of the largest 
shareholdings while OC5 was computed as the total percentage of the top 
five largest shareholdings. The purpose of using these two variables was to 
examine how the key shareholders affect debt. 
Additionally, three control variables, namely firm’s growth, profitability 
and firm’s size were also included. Firm growth (GROWTH) is calculated 
as changes in assets as compared to the prior year (McConnell & Servaes, 
1995). Firm size (SIZE) is one of the variables because many researchers 
believe  it can affect the link between ownership concentration and debt (Su 
and Li, 2013). It is calculated as the logarithm of total sales. Larger firms 
are expected to have more debts. Profitability (ROA) is an indicator used to 
measure the firm’s profitability, and it is calculated as net income divided 
by total assets (Shyu & Lee, 2009; Amato and Burson, 2007). According to 
Barber and Lyon (1997), operating income is obscured by tax 
consideration, interest payment and minority interest, so that net income is 
a cleaner measures than earnings of the productivity of operating assets. 
Putting them together, we derive: 
 
Debti,t = β0 + β1OCi,t + β2GROWTHi,t + β3SIZEi,t + β4ROAi,t + εi,t          
    (1) 
where i = company, t = year, β0 = constant term, and ε = residuals 
 
4. Empirical Findings  
 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics of the aforementioned variables. 
The LTD (long term debt) accounts for an average value of 17.71%, 
suggesting that the sample companies have a low level of long term debt 
(Su & Li, 2013). In other words, their financing was via short-term debt. 
Total debt (TD) amounted to 31.01%, with a maximum value of 32.54%. 
The mean value is higher compared with that of Suto (2003), who found 
the total debt of Malaysian firms (for data from 1995 to 1999) was 29.66% 
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and Drieffield, Mahambre, and Pal (2007) at 26% mean value of debt for 
Malaysian firms (for data 1994 to 1998). Average concentrated ownership 
of largest shareholder (OC1) was 41.50%, while average concentrated 
ownership of five largest shareholders (OC5) was 54.90%. The average 
GROWTH had a mean of 13.08% while SIZE had a mean value of about 
2.76. The mean profitability (ROA) indicated a low profitability (Su & Li, 
2013). 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
  Mean  Maximum  Minimum  Std. Dev. 
LTD 0.1771 7.3597 0 0.3715 
TD 0.3101 32.544 0 1.5495 
OC1 0.4150 38.3700 0 1.8279 
OC5 0.5449 0.8770 0 0.2314 
GROWTH 0.1308 0.5740 -37.7062 1.8127 
SIZE 2.7622 4.5738 -1.9586 1.1535 
ROA 0.0829 0.7306 -0.1461 0.0905 
 
4.2  Multivariate Regression Analysis  
 
Table 2 contains the findings of panel data regression analyses. First, 
pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) regression using LTD as a dependent 
variable was conducted. Even though polled OLS regression cannot adjust 
for firm-specific or time-specific effects, Model 1 is still used to 
showpooled OLS for robust check. The findings indicate that concentrated 
ownership of the largest shareholders (OC1) and the five largest 
shareholders (OC5) are both negatively associated with LTD at 1% 
significance level. The results show a R2 of 8.07% and 8.08% respectively, 
consistent with Su and Li (2013) and Billett and Mauer (2003), and an F-
statistic of 9.4926 and 9.5241 respectively which is significant at 1% level. 
To ensure the study uses the most appropriate model, Breusch and 
Pagan (1980) Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test was conducted for cross-
sectional dependence. Based on the result of LM test below, the LM 
statistic (P < 0.05) suggested that panel data regression outperformed 
pooled OLS regression. Next, a Hausman test (Greene, 2003; Wooldridge, 
2010) was conducted to decide whether to employ a fixed effect model 
(FEM) or a random effect model (REM) in the regression analysis. Based 
on the Hausman test statistics below, a p-value of less than 0.05 suggests 
the use of a fixed effect specification. Thus, this study employed FEM. 
With these models, the differences across firms were dealt with by allowing 
firm-varying intercepts when estimating regression models. 
From the OC1 perspective, the empirical evidences of Model 1 depicted 
a significantly negative relationship between concentrated ownership of the 
largest shareholder (OC1) and debt structure at the 1% level. Consistently, 
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when OC1 was replaced with OC5, the finding also indicated that 
concentrated ownership of the five largest shareholders (OC5) was 
significantly and negatively associated with LTD at  1% significance level. 
The result was consistent with those of Billet and Mauer (2003), Lean, Ting 
and Kweh (2015) and Lo et al. (2016). Concentrated ownership of the five 
largest shareholders was also negatively associated with LTD at the 1% 
significance level. These results supported Hypothesis 1 that a significant 
association exists between ownership concentration and debt structure. 
Specifically, the greater the ownership concentration is, the lower the long-
term debt would be. Put differently, a higher level of monitoring may mean 
a lower level of debt.  
 
Table 2: Multivariate Regression Analysis for LTD 
 
OLS Fixed Effect 
Variable 
Coefficient 
(t-Statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-Statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-Statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-Statistic) 
C 0.0289  
(0.4891) 
0.0284 
 (0.4829) 
0.0330  
(0.5480) 
0.0327  
(0.5450)  
OC1 -0.2585***  
(-3.3482) 
 -0.2602***  
(-3.3479) 
 
 
OC5  -0.2576*** 
(-3.3627) 
 -0.2596***  
(-3.3641)  
GROWT
H 
-0.2622*** 
 (-3.3744) 
-0.0036 
(-0.3887) 
-0.2642*** 
(-3.3800) 
-0.0040  
(-0.4216) 
 
SIZE 0.0865*** 
(5.4974) 
0.0865*** 
(5.5033) 
0.0858*** 
(5.3982) 
0.0858*** 
(5.4063)  
ROA 0.6106*** 
(3.1160) 
0.6113*** 
(3.1246) 
0.5955*** 
(3.0260) 
0.5959*** 
(3.0325)  
Hausman 
Test  
 
P < 0.05 
F-statistic 9.4926*** 9.5241*** 5.1186*** 5.1362*** 
DW               1.9285 1.9246 1.9242 1.9204 
Adj R-sq 0.0807 0.0808 0.0873 0.0874 
Note: *, **, and *** denote the significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1% 
respectively. Fixed effects include year and industry dummies. 
 
Du & Dai (2005) explained the larger the ownership concentration is, 
the higher the likelihood of the former to overwhelm the minority investors, 
aggravating agency problems to result in higher cost of debt financing. 
Short term debt could limit the opportunism behaviour in companies 
compared with long term debt. In order to constrain the ultimate controlling 
shareholders, banks thus, have greater tendency to supply short-term funds, 
so that risks can be reduced, especially for the firms with large ownership 
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concentration, be it the five largest shareholders and or the largest 
shareholder. 
This study had performed a robustness check by replacing LTD with 
TD (see results in Table 3). The same results hold when we replace LTD 
with TD. They reconfirm that low levels of debt structure are likely 
observed in firms with a high percentage of concentrated ownership. In 
summary, our results are robust to the alternative measures of the debt ratio 
and alternative methods of running the data. 
 
Table 3: Robust test: Multivariate Regression Analysis for TD 
 
OLS Fixed Effect 
Variable 
Coefficient 
(t-Statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-Statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-Statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-Statistic) 
C 0.2161  
(0.8597) 
0.2115  
(0.8455) 
 0.2419 
 (0.5480) 
0.2388  
(0.9362)  
OC1 -0.9396***  
(-2.8636) 
 -0.9525*** 
 (-2.8861) 
 
 
OC5  -0.9311*** 
(-2.8602) 
 -0.9465*** 
(-2.8879)  
GROWTH -0.9484*** 
(-2.8722) 
-0.0087 
(-0.218) 
-0.9628*** 
(-2.9007) 
-0.0102  
(-0.2554)  
SIZE 0.1246* 
(1.8622) 
0.1241* 
(1.8579) 
0.1202* 
(1.7806) 
    0.1198* 
    (1.7772)  
ROA 3.1614*** 
(3.7965) 
3.1674*** 
(3.8098) 
3.0819*** 
(3.6884) 
3.0858*** 
(3.6986) 
 
Hausman 
Test  
 
P < 0.05 
F-statistic 5.2806*** 5.2801*** 3.1065*** 3.1101*** 
DW               2.0071 2.0025 2.0040 1.9996 
Adj R-sq 0.0466 0.0465 0.0548 0.0548 
Note: *, **, and *** denote the significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1% 
respectively. Fixed effects include year and industry dummies. 
 
In summary, active engagement of large shareholders in controlling 
management to improve the role of debt may mean expropriation issue 
between large and minority shareholders (Short, Keassey and Dexbury, 
2002; Liu, Tian and Wang, 2011) because the former care more about their 
own  interest (La Porta, Lopes-de-Silanes and Shleifer, 1999; Liu, Tian and 
Wang, 2011; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
This study has investigated the association between ownership 
concentration and debt structure in Malaysia by examining a sample of 88 
companies from top 100 Malaysia public listed companies between 2011 
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and 2015. The empirical results showed that ownership concentration with 
largest shareholding had a negatively relationship with  debt structure. 
Specifically, concentrated ownership with five largest shareholders was 
negatively associated with debt structure, Overall, the results of this study 
point to a significantly negative link between ownership concentration and 
debt structure among public listed companies in Malaysia. 
The findings pose an interesting question. Large shareholders are likely 
to influence the debt structure of a company, suggesting they are a player in 
the decision-making process of the firm. Future research can examine the 
potential conflict between shareholders and managers, as well as potential 
issues between large and minority shareholders. Funders may have to 
consider twice before lending money to companies with ownership 
concentration because of potential expropriation issue and also lower 
transparency. 
The generalisability of these findings is liable to specific restrictions. 
Future research  may focus on the different roles of  shareholders as well as 
include more variables to establish a stronger link between ownership 
concentrations and debt structure. Additionally, ownership concentration 
may be divided into largest and smallest shareholders and include short 
term debts as well. 
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